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Abstract
Historically, the poaching of wildlife was portrayed as a small-scale local activity in
which only small numbers of wildlife would be smuggled illegally by collectors or
opportunists. Nowadays, this image has changed: criminal networks are believed to be
highly involved in wildlife trafficking, which has become a significant area of illicit
activity. Even though wildlife trafficking has become accepted as a major area of crime
and an important topic and criminologists have examined a variety of illegal wildlife
markets, research that specifically focusses on the involvement of different criminal
networks and their specific nature is lacking. The concept of a ‘criminal network’ or
‘serious organized crime’ is amorphous – getting used interchangeably and describes
all crime that is structured rather than solely reflecting crime that fits within normative
definitions of ‘organized’ crime. In reality, criminal networks are diverse. As such, we
propose categories of criminal networks that are evidenced in the literature and within
our own fieldwork: (1) organized crime groups (2) corporate crime groups and (3)
disorganized criminal networks. Whereas there are instances when these groups act
alone, this article will (also) discuss the overlap and interaction that occurs between our
proposed categories and discuss the complicated nature of the involved criminal
networks as well as predictions as to the future of these networks.
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Introduction
The loss of biodiversity is one of the many environmental crises our planet is facing.
One aspect of biodiversity loss is the poaching and trafficking of wildlife.1 In the past,
the poaching of wildlife was portrayed as a small-scale local activity in which only
small numbers of wildlife would be smuggled illegally by collectors or opportunists
(e.g. Roe et al. 2002). The perception was that lone individuals poached, usually for
subsistence reasons. Nowadays, this image has changed: criminal networks are be-
lieved to be highly involved in wildlife trafficking, which has become a significant area
of illicit activity (Nellemann et al. 2016; Interpol 2019). Even though wildlife traffick-
ing is now recognised as a major area of crime and has become an important topic for
some criminologists (e.g. Pires and Moreto 2011; Wyatt 2013; Nurse 2015; Sollund
and Maher 2015; van Uhm 2016a; Wong 2019; Zimmerman 2003 amongst numerous
others), research that specifically focusses on the involvement of different criminal
networks and their specific nature is lacking. This paper provides original insight into
the differences of the criminal networks active in wildlife trafficking. The concept of a
‘criminal network’ or ‘serious organized crime’ is amorphous – getting used inter-
changeably and describes all crime that is structured rather than solely reflecting crime
that fits within normative definitions of ‘organized’ crime. As Titeca (2019: 25) notes
for his research into the organisation of the illegal ivory trade “dominant statements on
‘ballooning criminal networks’, ‘crime syndicates’ and ‘gangs’ remain only that:
statements, without an explanation or empirical analysis on what these look like or
how this trade is organized”. As we evidence in this paper, in reality, the criminal
networks engaging in wildlife trafficking are diverse. The varied structures and perpe-
tration tactics of these differing criminal networks mean that different prevention and
disruption strategies need to be employed in order to save wildlife. Drawing on the
existing literature and data collected from our own fieldwork, we propose three
categories of criminal networks: (1) organized crime groups (2) corporate crime groups
and (3) disorganized criminal networks. For each of the categories, we first define the
parameters of the actors. We do so by explaining the structure and uniqueness of each
of these categories. Then, in each categories’ section, we provide examples of the
structure. We then discuss the overlap and interaction that occurs between our proposed
categories. We conclude with a discussion regarding the complicated nature of the
involved criminal networks as well as predictions as to the future of these networks and
thoughts on why further understanding of criminal network structures can help tackle
wildlife trafficking.2
1 We acknowledge that the terms ‘poaching’ and ‘wildlife’ are contentious to some scholars and that the term
‘poaching’ has a legal connotation in respect of game laws as opposed to wildlife protection and conservation
law. However, as our article is on the networks facilitating trafficking, it is beyond the scope to wade into these
definitional debates, though we do so in other publications (XXX Forthcoming 2020).
2 While it is beyond the scope of this article to examine in detail motivations for engagement in wildlife crime,
we note that previous research identifies varied motivations from pursuit of profit, offending caused by and
reinforcing masculinities, and offending motivated by opportunity and allied to diversification from other
revenue streams (XXX 2013; The citation “XXXX 2011” has been changed to “XXXXX, 2011a, b” to match
the author name/date in the reference list. Please check if the change is fine in this occurrence and modify the
subsequent occurrences, if necessary.XXXXX 2011a, 2011b).
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Wildlife crime groups
That wildlife trafficking is or has likely become more structured and is not made up
solely of individual actors breaking rules seems to have taken place in the context of a
globalising market place focused on the ‘war’ on drugs and terrorism. Attracted by low
law enforcement priority, low sentences, the affordability of fines, and the small chance
of getting caught and receiving punishment, criminal networks, have evolved within or
stepped into wildlife markets (Schaedla 2017; Wellsmith 2011), bringing with them
organization and sophistication and a range of motivations and operating practices
(Nurse 2013; South and Wyatt 2011; Wyatt 2011). In this section, we will show that
these criminal networks or groups are not homogenous and organized crime groups,
corporate crime groups, and disorganized crime networks utilize different approaches
and become involved in different wildlife markets.
Organized crime groups
In one sense, trafficking is a consequence of supply and demand such that poaching of
wildlife makes sound economic sense for established criminals and opportunistic rule
breakers.3 White and Heckenberg (2014: 286) identify that ‘in recent years, greater
attention has been given internationally to the role of organized crime networks in
regard to environmental crime’ and to wildlife trafficking in particular. Yet organized
crime group’s involvement in wildlife trafficking is not a new phenomenon (Søyland
2000; ECOSOC 2002, 2003; Zimmerman 2003; Wyler and Sheikh 2008). Cook et al.
(2002: 4) noted almost 20 years ago ‘organised crime elements are becoming increas-
ingly involved in the most lucrative parts of the illegal trade and they are prepared to
use intimidation and violence’, but what though is meant by organized crime?
As Paoli (2001) and Paoli and Van der Beken (2014) (among others) have proposed
there is no unanimous or agreed upon definition of organized crime or organized crime
groups. It is unclear what is organized (the Italian mafia, the Chinese triads) or
disorganized (groups of pickpockets), how many members have to be involved in
order to be considered as organized crime and why certain activities are seen as
organized (human or drug trafficking) while others are not (cybercrime) (Paoli 2001;
Siegel 2008). Passas (1995) highlights that an indication of organized crime could be
the degree of organization and structure.4 The group supplies illegal goods and/or
services, and the activities have an element of continuity and rationality (Hagan 1983).
Since organized crime operates outside the law, there are no legal contracts to guarantee
the delivery of the illegally traded product. Organized crime groups use their own
internal system to solve conflicts or disputes in illegal activities (Siegel 2008; Gambetta
2009). Fijnaut et al. (1996) and Arlacchi (1998) add, that in general the groups are all
3 We note above the definitional problems with the term ‘poaching’ and in the context of this article’s
discussion of wildlife trafficking it refers to unlawful taking of wildlife without any connotation of accepting
wildlife as property, something we discuss in forthcoming publications (Nurse and Wyatt forthcoming 2020)..
4 Traditionally, organized crime has been portrayed as pyramidal structured organizations with a strict
hierarchy and clear divisions of tasks and internal rules and sanction systems (c.f. Block and Chambliss
1981). The current perspective on organized crime has changed into more fluid and flexible organized
networks anticipating opportunities for illegal markets (e.g. Paoli 2001; Fijnaut and Paoli 2004; Morselli
2009).
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supported by violence and corruption to facilitate their criminal activities. However,
Passas (1995: xvi) underlines that “[v]iolence, corruption and control of the market are
more prominent features (…) but they should not be exaggerated.”
We suggest (and outline below) organized crime groups are highly-organized,
disciplined, rational, and may use violence or corruption to control illegal goods and/
or services for profit. In addition, the group has existed for a significant length of time.
This definition does not fit the use of criminal networks or organized crime that seems
to be utilized in the media or popular coverage of wildlife trafficking. Take, for
instance, the BBC News coverage that wildlife crime involves ‘huge, organised
criminal networks’ (Surgue 2019), but then provides no evidence of structure,
longevity and so forth. Likewise, as Reid et al. (2018) state one of the key themes of
the ‘London Conference on Illegal Wildlife Trade’ in 2018 was to treat illegal wildlife
trade as an international, organised crime. No nuance in terms of the diversity of illicit
wildlife markets was mentioned and no definition of what organised crime is was
given.
Our definition also differs from the definition agreed to in the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its accompanying
protocols. In Annex 1, Article 2 (a) of UNTOC organized crime is defined as a.
“structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting
in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences
established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly,
a financial or other material benefit” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) 2004: 5).
Clearly, UNTOC’s conceptualization of organized crime includes organization,
longevity and profit as a motive. It does not, however, include ‘highly-organized’ or
‘violence’ and with only three people needed to constitute a group, such a definition
seems to include most crime that is organized or structured. Pires and Moreto (2011:
104) astutely noted that organized “can simply mean anything from three individuals
who are loosely organized together to a vast criminal enterprise that comprises all
stages of the wildlife trade (i.e. vertically integrated organizations)”. In addition,
UNTOC requires the crime committed to be ‘serious’. This is defined in Article 2b
as, “conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of
at least four years or a more serious penalty” (United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) 2004: 5). Thus, the definition of what is serious is linked to the
severity of punishment - imprisonment of more than four years – rather than specific
crimes or the nature of harm caused to wildlife or ecosystems (White and Heckenberg
2014; Hall 2015). Therefore, organized crime is likely interpreted differently in differ-
ent countries. It may well include a great deal of crimes, since it is a broad definition
and as the above example demonstrates, but it also may well exclude crimes that are not
deemed ‘serious’.5
As mentioned, the UNTOC definition gives no indication of the types of crimes that
are serious, but does include that crimes are committed in order to directly or indirectly
5 A green criminological perspective on ecological justice would argue that the harm caused is what
determines the importance or seriousness of a crime or action rather than its classification according to
criminal law sanctions (Benton 1998; Hall 2015; The citation “XXX 2015” has been changed to “XXXX,
2015” to match the author name/date in the reference list. Please check if the change is fine in this occurrence
and modify the subsequent occurrences, if necessary.XXXX 2015)
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gain financially or materially. This leaves room for interpretation that departs from
views of organized crime as, as Paoli (2001) proposed, hierarchical groups operating in
the ‘underworld’. Instead, organized crime groups, as Paoli (2001) found in Russia,
may engage in ‘underworld’ or ‘upperworld’ activities involving institutions of the
former Communist Party and the state industries. In addition, organized crime thrives
well in economically weak states and regions in which the government fails to
effectively use the monopoly of violence (Bovenkerk et al. 2003). The infrastructure
and market knowledge of organized crime groups is readily adaptable to moving a wide
range of commodities whether they be drugs, weapons, or wildlife. For example, the
distant fishing areas for caviar with high levels of unemployment, weapon and drug
trafficking in Dagestan (in the Caucasus) provide perfect conditions for poaching
sturgeons, while the remote parts of the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia are known
to be one of the most undeveloped places in the region with significant trade in rhino
horns, tiger bone wine and ivory (van Uhm and Wong 2019). Although these regions
are known for drug and/or arms trafficking,6 they have also become breeding grounds
for wildlife crime groups and the overlap is not surprising (van Uhm 2016a; van Uhm
2020). We will return to this later when we explore the overlaps between organized
crime groups, corporate crime groups and disorganized crime networks, but it indicates
that even within the category of organized crime groups there are variations.7
Now that the definition of organised crime groups as conceptualised in this article
has been drawn out from the literature, we provide examples from the literature and our
fieldwork to support the existence of this category. As mentioned, organized crime
groups have a high degree of organisation and continuity. We suggest that the use of
violence and corruption are likely indicators of the level of criminal organization and
distinguish them as an organized crime group rather than a disorganized crime network.
Such aspects are clearly observable in the illegal caviar trade, in which organized crime
groups dominate police and maintain their power by violence to control the transfer of
caviar from the poaching areas (e.g. Dagestan) to the destination countries in Europe.
There are several examples where military attacks, bombings, kidnappings and coun-
terstrategies reflect the high degree of organization (van Uhm and Siegel 2016). The
emergence of organized crime groups in rhino horn trafficking that were previously
involved in other serious forms of crime illustrate the attractiveness of wildlife crimes
to organized crime. Such organized crime groups were involved in other illegalities
(drugs, tobacco trafficking) and are now active in rhino horn trafficking or could be
considered as multifaceted organized crime groups, involved in several illegal trades
simultaneously (van Uhm 2019, 2020).
One of the strongest examples of organized crime groups in wildlife trafficking
comes from ivory. At least part of ivory smuggling (see disorganised crime networks
and overlap sections below) is regularly perpetrated by organized crime groups, which
6 The Caucasus is an important region for weapons, drugs and human trafficking (e.g. Arasli 2007) and the
Golden Triangle is notorious for the blooming opium and amphetamine trade (e.g. Zhang et al. 2008).
7 While profit is a dominant driver, the large-scale cartel-style groups are not the only organized crime actors
operating within wildlife trafficking. Supply of wildlife for trafficking is predominantly economically-
motivated activity driven by anthropocentric views towards animals as commodities to be traded and
exploited. Organized crime’s involvement is that of procurer of goods for customers in a demand-led market
(Schneider 2008). Because of the organization and infrastructure, organized crime groups are able to secure the
wildlife and get the wildlife to a manufacturer or a seller.
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are attracted by the high profits and low risks (Naylor 2004). Furthermore, organized
crime is also capable of successfully navigating the complex smuggling operations that
need to take place in order to smuggle a fully illegal product over long distances.
Organized crime then can and does form part of the ivory network seemingly because
of their level of sophistication (Naylor 2004). Another example is of the Mexican fish -
the totoaba. These fish have swim bladders that are prized in traditional Chinese
medicine and are currently targeted by organized criminal groups, which orchestrate
the fishing of the totoaba as well as the complicated smuggling from Baja, Mexico
through the United States to the Chinese market (Alvarado Martínez and Regina
Martínez 2018). Research by Arroyo-Quiroz and Wyatt (2019) found that experts
believe former drug cartels are smuggling the totoaba because it is muchmore profitable
and less risky than drug trafficking. The presence or absence of a legal trade and the
amount of profit to be had from the species of wildlife seem to be relevant to which type
of criminal group or network becomes involved. Whereas caviar, a legal market, draws
in organized crime groups, so does ivory and totoaba, internationally illegal markets.
What may be more prevalent in wildlife markets that are legal is the involvement of
corporate crime groups.
Corporate crime groups
To begin this section, first, we define what we mean by corporation, corporate crime
and corporate crime group. As in the previous section, we then move on to provide
examples of this category. A corporation is any business or company that is registered
with their own or another countries’ territory (Wyatt and Davies Forthcoming 2020).
This includes small family-owned businesses to multi-national corporations. Corporate
crime can be defined as:
“illegal acts or omissions, punishable by the State under administrative, civil or
criminal law, which are the result of deliberate decision making or culpable negligence
within a legitimate formal organisation. These acts or omissions are based in legitimate,
formal, business organisations, made in accordance with the normative goals, standard
operating procedures, and/or cultural norms of the organisation, and are intended to
benefit the corporation itself” (Pearce and Tombs 1998: 107–10).
Similarly, Box (1983: 20) proposes corporate crimes are acts of “omission or
commission by an individual or group of individuals in a legitimate formal organization
– which have serious physical or economic impacts on employees, consumers or the
general public”. Key to these definitions is that the person or group are acting as part of
a recognized legitimate organization. These definitions of corporate crime do not
indicate anything about the corporations’ relationships with other actors or perpetrators.
We suggest that corporations, like organized crime groups, form networks that enable
the perpetration of crimes (see also Ruggiero 1996). A corporate crime group then
would consist of one or more corporations using their legitimate formal organization
and acting in conjunction with other individuals or outside groups to commit illegal
8 In addition to the definition of legitimate corporate actors engaged in illegal activity, illegitimate corporations
set up for the purposes of engaging in wildlife trafficking represent another form of organised corporate
activity.
Trends in Organized Crime
activities to benefit the corporation.8 Such intertwined relationships between the
upperworld and the underworld activities characterize much wildlife trafficking.
For instance, the illegal transport of wildlife may be perpetrated by corporate crime
groups. Based on analyses of the occupations of illegal wildlife traders within the EU, a
large proportion of the recorded offenders in Europe (> 30%) appear to also act legally
in relation to wildlife (van Uhm 2016c). Such perpetrators consist of legally registered
animal traders, zoos, circuses, antique shops, fashion trading companies or breeding
companies of exotic animals and could provide a perfect cover for wildlife laundering.
During wildlife laundering, the illegal origin of wildlife or wildlife products are
concealed; the wildlife is declared as being a legally obtained product to get documents
that prove the legality or fraudulent permits are obtained through corrupt means saying
that it is a legal captive-bred individual (Wyatt 2013). In other words, a wildlife trader
or breeder orders illegal wildlife from a poacher and then declares the wildlife as
captive-bred to ship to its final destination by using their legal infrastructure (e.g. Lyons
and Natusch 2011). For example, Nijman and Shepherd (2009) and Lyons and Natusch
(2011) describe substantial discrepancies between the annual exported number of
reptiles from Indonesia and the number of reptiles capable of being produced by
Indonesian breeding farms. Comparably, Shepherd et al. (2012) discovered large
numbers of wild-caught birds, such as hornbills, parrots and birds-of-paradise that were
laundered into the global wildlife trade through the Solomon Islands by alleged
breeders; again, they declared wild-caught animals as being captive-bred. Another
example is the possibility to launder illegally sourced caviar through aquaculture
operations of sturgeons. Wild-caught sturgeons for breeding purposes are not released
or caviar from wild sturgeons will be shipped as having been produced in fish farms
(Jahrl 2013; van Uhm and Siegel 2016). The latter example reflects the overlap
between corporate crime and organized crime as some of the official directors of the
current sturgeon farms in Russia were the ‘big fishes’ in the illegal trade in caviar in the
post-Soviet period (van Uhm and Siegel 2016). These examples illustrate that corpo-
rations can play important roles in the transit and transformation of illegal into legal
wildlife. They also demonstrate that corporations are not acting in isolation; they are
core offenders in a network that also includes individuals and other groups, who may
supply illegal wildlife or receive laundered wildlife.9
Thus, corporations and businesses potentially launder wildlife, in order to increase
profits by blending illegal trade into their licit activities. Christy (2008) documents this
8 In addition to the definition of legitimate corporate actors engaged in illegal activity, illegitimate corporations
set up for the purposes of engaging in wildlife trafficking represent another form of organised corporate
activity.
9 Often a separate area of research from wildlife trafficking, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU)
provides numerous examples of corporate crime groups. A recent C4ADS (2019) study found that onshore
corporations are integral to IUU fishing. Many of the red flag indicators of IUU fishing activity are linked to an
individual employee or a corporation. These red flag indicators are: manipulation or dismantling of a ships’
automated identification system, “the use of flags of convenience, repeatedly reflagging to another flag state,
flying multiple flags, or flying no flag at all”, using specific private or public ports because of weak regulatory
oversight, at sea transfers of catch and supplies, and repeatedly changing vessel identifiers like name, callsign,
and outward appearance (The citation “C4 2019” has been changed to “C4ADS, 2019” to match the author
name/date in the reference list. Please check if the change is fine in this occurrence and modify the subsequent
occurrences, if necessary.C4ADS 2019: 15). The actions likely have to be ordered, authorized, or at least
known about by individuals within the corporation. IUU fishing is deeply entrenched in the legal seafood
supply with up to 30% being linked to IUU practices in the US (Pramod et al. 2014).
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for a pet shop in Florida, USA where the owners ran a parallel black-market trade in
reptiles in addition to their public legitimate pet store. In these cases of what Wyatt
(2013, 2016) categorizes as ‘collectors’ items’ (rare wildlife in demand for a person’s or
organisation’s collection), the profits are quite high. Corporations or businesses are also
integral to the trafficking of low value processed commodities, those wildlife that are
less rare and need to be altered into a final product (Wyatt 2013). Taxidermy of wildlife
is a clear example of this, where a business undertaking the preservation of the wildlife
specimen is likely to know that it is illegal to possess that species of wildlife. The level
of profit and scale of this portion of processed commodities though is low level, which
presumably is why organized crime groups are not entrenched within this particular
black market (Wyatt 2013). There are instances though where networks exist, but
neither corporations nor organized crime are involved.
Disorganised crime networks
In addition to organized and corporate crime groups, we draw upon Reuter’s (1986)
proposed concept of disorganized crime. In his conceptualization of disorganized, the
criminal group is structured, does not employ violence as a tool and are often not
territorial, highly-organized or monopolistic. Therefore, the UNTOC’s definition of
organized crime discussed in 2.1 fits more of Reuter’s (1986) definition of disorganized
crime. We expand upon this to propose disorganized crime networks. We use the term
network, since in many cases of wildlife trafficking the structure of disorganized crime
encompasses several countries and occurs transnationally. Furthermore, the smuggling
apparatus are characterized by swift and sometimes temporary and fluid relationships
between actors that react to socio-economic, political and ecological changes by
looking for opportunities for illegal activities (Bauman 2000; Morselli 2009). Thus,
these networks are more fleeting and less stable than a group. These networks of
opportunistic individuals, such as truck drivers, corrupt border officials, intermediaries,
express couriers and so forth, establish temporary and fluid relationships to each other
and sometimes to established organized and/or corporate crime groups to smuggle
wildlife across the borders. There are numerous examples of illegal entrepreneurs
transferring illegal wildlife to a middleman or final buyer, without being part of an
organized crime group, but linked to a disorganized crime network (e.g. Pires and
Moreto 2011; Leberatto 2016). As Hübschle (2016: 195) found, the illegal wildlife
trade is a ‘business enterprise facilitated by a multitude of diverse actors with close,
limited or no links to “organized crime”.
For example, research has shown portions of the illegal ivory trade are disorganised
crime networks. Law enforcement in Uganda have reported that the illegal trade there is
not linked to organised crime (Runhovde 2017), though the ivory fromUganda does end
up being smuggled to Asia. At the local level, the ivory traders in Uganda seem to be a
disorganised network, feeding into an amalgamated illegal container shipment that is
moved by organised crime groups (Titeca 2019). Other research has also shown
elements of ivory trafficking to be carried out by organised crime groups (Wasser
et al. 2015), but the groups of local elephant poachers are often linked to disorganized
crime groups, embedded in local communities surrounding the nature reserves where the
wild elephants are living. Such groups are familiar with the terrain and skilled in animal
tracking and sell their wildlife products via a middleman (e.g., Moreto et al. 2017).
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Across Asia similar disorganized poaching networks are active that poach on a daily or
ad hoc basis, sometimes based on requests from Chinese middlemen in Myanmar and
Laos, but regularly to sell low-valued wildlife species on local wildlife markets to local
traders (e.g. Nooren and Claridge 2001; Pantel and Chin 2009). Similarly, opportunistic
disorganized groups of poachers in Bolivia and Peru are responsible for parrot poaching,
which sell the birds at the illegal pet markets (Pires et al. 2016). Thus, depending on the
stage in trafficking one category of group may or may not be involved.
Another example of disorganised crime networks is of a Dutch illegal entrepreneur,
who smuggled ten hummingbirds and two sunbirds in his underpants on a flight from
Suriname to the Netherlands; he had a structured plan to sell the birds to acquaintances,
and was already convicted for the same activity before, but he did not have connections
to organized crime (van Uhm 2016c). Another case in which an opportunistic entre-
preneur purchased a monkey along the road during his holiday in the seaside resort of
Saïdia in Morocco, shows how these operations can also be based on ad hoc coalitions
as the entrepreneur bought the monkey on behalf of his friend who sold wildlife to
clients in Europe (XXX 2016a). In relation to caviar trafficking, many ‘opportunists’,
such as truck drivers or former residents, sell several kilos of caviar in the country of
destination to make some profit or to compensate for the fuel used. For example,
Iranian greengrocers in Europe smuggling several kilos of wild caviar from Iran each
year to supply their personal network could be seen as a disorganized crime network;
they sell their caviar bought in markets to Russian shops, restaurants or acquaintances
and friends on a small scale (van Uhm and Siegel 2016). Pires and Clarke (2011) also
identified that traders take advantage of opportunistic poaching of parrots by peasants,
arguably taking advantage of a disorganized network of ground actors who view
parrots as a commodity that can be sold onto others who handle distribution and sale
(Pires and Moretto, 2011). This illustrates how the relatively low level of organization,
and the high degree of opportunism in these disorganized criminal networks can enable
the smuggling of wildlife from the initial capture further down the chain.
Wildlife that is less valuable and where trade of the species may be legal or at least
limited appear not to be trafficked by organized crime or businesses. This is the case in
the black market of bush meat, which appears to be orchestrated by individuals in
loosely connected networks. Individuals travelling from source countries to London,
for instance, smuggle cane rats or other bush meat species in order to sell them at
markets in diaspora neighbourhoods (Lynn 2012). Similar patterns have been observed
for the illegal fur trade (Wyatt 2009) and portions of the smuggling of falcons (Wyatt
2011) and timber (Wyatt 2014). Whereas there is a level of organization to this, it is not
facilitated by organized crime groups or by a corporation.
The overlaps
The illegal wildlife trade is a chain of events or stages, and we like Titeca (2019)
acknowledge that at each of the links of the chain, there is the possibility that a number
of different actors may be involved. Also, depending on the region and the species, the
actors are likely to be different (Pires and Moreto 2011). Wildlife trafficking begins
with the capture, collection, or killing of wildlife. Wildlife are then smuggled either
alive, which requires more skills and sophistication, or dead or as a part, which means
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the wildlife will need to be hidden (Nurse 2013). The wildlife then will be sold at a
market or to the consumer. This may be undertaken by a middleman or distributor, but
usually not the person, who originally captured or killed the wildlife. Organised crime
groups may become more involved further along the chain (Pires and Moreto 2011). At
these various links in the chain of trafficking, our three proposed categories of groups
and networks have varying levels of involvement. Importantly, they also have varying
levels of interaction with one another.
The embeddedness of organized crime in legal sectors of the economy and the
connection between organized crime and corporate crime was largely discussed in the
1990s and 2000s (e.g. Van Duyne 1995; Ruggiero 1996; Passas 2002), but never in the
context of wildlife markets. It turned out that the line between legal and criminal is
regularly blurred, especially when legal and illegal actors interact with each other, such
as the traditional connection between the mafia and waste corporations (e.g. Block and
Scarpitt 1985). Evidence has emerged that there are several high-value trafficked
wildlife commodities that are a joint organized-corporate crime ventures too. In these
instances, processed commodities (Wyatt 2013) such as ivory, pangolins, caviar and
timber are trafficked by organized crime and the processing part takes place through
corporations. In the case of ivory, the carving of ivory has traditionally been legal for a
domestic market (Bennett 2014). For instance, trafficked ivory then could blend into
the domestic carving industry, but presumably, the businesses involved in carving were
and are aware that some of the ivory that they are processing and selling is sourced
illegally by organized crime groups. Similarly, timber processors and furniture manu-
facturers are legitimate businesses that seemingly play a role in the laundering of illegal
wildlife into the legal market where high consumer demand for timber arguably
encourages if not facilitates the illegal trade (Kishor and Lescuyer 2012). The level
of this involvement is worthy of further research to determine if it is purposeful or
whether it is due to lack of effective oversight of their supply chains.
Traditional medicines are similarly trafficked through a combination of organized
crime and corporate crime activities. For instance, Chinese organized crime groups in
Hong Kong supply traditional Chinese medicine with illegal animal parts to several
companies across China and even to the EU (van Uhm 2019; van Uhm and Wong
2019). Traditional medicines must be made though this is probably not to the scale of a
processed commodity in terms of infrastructure needed or potentially the scale required.
The difference in processing as well as traditional medicines’ long history of use and a
strong cultural element to their continued demand are why traditional medicines are a
separate wildlife market (Wyatt 2013). Traditional medicine businesses and doctors or
pharmacists that are selling and making traditional medicines know on some level that
there are, at times, illegal ingredients within the products. The companies making the
packaging for traditional medicines that falsely label products by leaving out endangered
species from the ingredients may well be aware of the true ingredients. There are also
medicine businesses in China that illegally buy rhino horn from organized crime groups to
supply it to their regular customers (see e.g., van Uhm 2019; van Uhm and Wong 2019).
Thus, these are organized-corporate crime collaborations facilitating wildlife trafficking.
In addition, there are many links between disorganized crime networks and orga-
nized or corporate crime groups. In contradiction to professional groups of poachers
with highly sophisticated equipment, such as heavy artillery and even helicopters to
detect the non-human animals, wildlife poaching groups regularly consist of
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disorganized groups of local people that traditionally are hunting for their living. Such
groups of poachers in Southeast Asia have been described as inhabitants of villages,
people who live near the forests or habitats, where the wildlife are hunted. As the
endangered animals are often located in economically deprived regions, there seems to
be a strong link between poaching and limited access to alternative livelihood options, a
lack of environmental education and poverty among local communities (e.g. Nooren
and Claridge 2001; Pantel and Anak 2010).10 However, some of those communities
supply their wildlife to organized crime groups, while others sell wildlife to corpora-
tions illegally. Sometimes the disorganized networks of poachers even obtain loans
from organized crime groups or from companies to cover their daily basic expenses
illustrated by different reports (e.g. Pantel and Chin 2009; Moyle 2009). Furthermore,
pangolin trafficking is perpetrated by disorganized crime networks, but there is a link to
corporate crime as well. Courier companies have been found to have cargo ships full of
frozen illegal pangolin meat (Carrington 2013).
Thus, the distinction between organized crime, corporate crime and disorganized
crime is rather fluid. They also may be evident in discreet stages of trafficking rather
than present throughout the entirety of one individual wildlife being captured or killed,
smuggled, and finally sold. According to Ruggiero (1996) it would be a matter of
degree to what extent offenders are involved in both legal and illegal spheres of the
economy. Because many wildlife are not illegal by themselves, there are legal and
illegal pangolins, caviar tins and parts of ivory on the market. Consequently, the
organized, corporate and disorganized crime groups and networks are not solely active
in the underworld, but rather embedded in upperworld activities. From laundering
wildlife to collaborating with upperworld figures, the groups are interacting with their
environment to transfer the wildlife into the (legitimate) supply market. Therefore, the
symbiotic relation between corporate crime and organized or disorganized crime is
evident in wildlife trafficking as corporations can shadow illegal activities of organized
or disorganized crime groups or organized and disorganized crime groups can launder
their wildlife through a company to get it into the legitimate market.
Discussion and conclusion
With globalization and expanding markets, a range of criminal networks have become
involved in different stages of the illegal wildlife trade. We have proposed that these are
organized crime groups, corporate crime groups, and disorganized crime networks as
well as collaborations between such groups (in addition to unattached individuals that
also function in this market). Table 1 outlines our suggested characteristics of these
three proposed categories based on our empirical research and analysis of the existing
literature. Arguably each are distinctive in terms of: levels of organization, degree to
which they act opportunistically, have links to other crimes, and employ corruption.
Corruption is often a key facilitator and integral part of these laundering processes. In
wildlife trafficking, corruption is manifested in different forms: accepting bribes during
10 For instance, poachers of pangolins in usually poor local communities make 10–50% of their income from
the trade (Pantel and Anak 2010). Ideal candidates to recruit as poachers for tigers come from indigenous
communities with strong hunting cultures, such as the Indian Bawariya and Behliya tribes (Moyle 2009).
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border crossings, the making of false claims of captive breeding and the involvement of
government officials in the smuggling process are well-known examples (see also van
Uhm and Moreto 2018 and Wyatt and Cao 2015). Organized crime groups are highly
organized, sometimes act opportunistically, often if not always have links to other
crimes (particularly other illicit markets), and rely on corruption as a tool to perpetrate
their illegal activities.11 In contrast, corporate crime groups, are also highly organized
and sometimes act opportunistically, but they are less likely to be linked to other crimes
and are less reliant on public corruption to facilitate their activities though they
themselves can be considered corrupt. The disorganized crime networks are the least
organized, are the most likely to act opportunistically, can sometimes be linked to other
crimes, but not necessarily and have the lowest use of corruption as a tool of
perpetration.
These distinctions arise for a number of reasons. During the first stage of poaching,
organised crime groups and disorganized crime networks seem to be involved in the
procurement of wildlife (in addition to subsistence and opportunistic poaching). Even
though all three criminal groups/networks primarily focus on wildlife as a profit-driven
offence, the more organized poaching groups arguably exist within communities, with
their own social norms accepting their deviant activities and anthropocentric world-
views (Nurse 2013). The criminal groups involved in smuggling wildlife from the
source country to the destination country can be differentiated between organized crime
groups, corporate crime groups and disorganized crime networks each with
interconnecting characteristics. While there are numerous examples of criminal net-
works with a high degree of opportunism and low level of organization, well-organized
forms of corporate and organized crime involved in wildlife trafficking do actively and
structurally commit wildlife crimes. The latter category correlates with a high degree of
corruption as well as links with other serious crimes such as drug trafficking (South and
Wyatt 2011; Wyatt 2011; van Uhm 2019; van Uhm and Wong 2019). The trafficking of
live protected non-human animals is regularly connected to legal enterprises as part of
corporate crime groups because skills and knowledge of those specific species are
required to keep them alive during the illegal activities, while banned processed items
(e.g. ivory) or raw materials (e.g. timber, rhino horn) may rather be in the hands of
sophisticated organized crime groups (Wyatt 2013). Here it is specifically relevant if the
products are available on legitimate markets so that laundering can take place (Lyons
and Natusch 2011; Nijman and Shepherd 2009) and joint organized-corporate crime
ventures emerge.
In particular, high-value wildlife attracts organized and corporate crime. In general,
this seems to be coupled with the wildlife market being (largely) illegal (i.e. ivory,
whale) and/or the legal market having a parallel black market (i.e. caviar), where the
smuggling of the wildlife requires a complex sophisticated network of actors. The
complexity and sophistication present may be because the smuggling distances are
long, thus, the need to hide the wildlife, or the need to have the funds to bribe numerous
agents along the way. Furthermore, complexity and sophistication may stem from the
11 In a recent investigation, ‘Operation Cactus’, three Dutch wildlife traders were convicted for smuggling
exotic animals, and involvement in a criminal organization. However, it is interesting to note that actors
involved in such wildlife networks, like the main defendant in this specific case, do not consider themselves
explicitly as an organized crime or mafia organization, but rather a network of entrepreneurs (van Uhm 2016b;
van Uhm and Siegel 2016).
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infrastructure required to process the wildlife (i.e. ivory or timber). The high value of
the wildlife is seen not only because of the high final selling price of the wildlife, such
as with ivory and rhino horn, but also if the quantity is significant enough to make the
value of the wildlife high as in the case of pangolins. Corporations can be part of
organized crimes’ complex sophisticated network of actors for the trafficking of some
wildlife. This seems to be the case when the wildlife needs to be processed before it is
sold and when illegal wildlife needs to be laundered into the legal market. Corporations
are not only able to collaborate with organized crime groups. They also traffic wildlife.
As mentioned, this is an aspect of the perpetration of wildlife trafficking that is greatly
overlooked since there is little empirical evidence to document the intent and knowl-
edge of corporations and businesses in industries where it is known that illegal wildlife
is blended in with and laundered into the legal markets (i.e. timber and pets).
As we indicate in Table 1, the level of corruption engaged with by different actors
(groups) is variable and context specific. For instance, in Vietnam, a transit and
destination country in wildlife trafficking, wildlife smugglers invest tens of thousands
of dollars to bribe border officials. Not only are the geographic setting and socioeco-
nomic context of Vietnam of great importance, also Vietnam’s ‘culture of envelope’
reflect the ordinary practices of ‘speedmoney’; ‘public servants are given small amounts
of money in envelopes to complete their duties’ (Wyatt and Cao 2015: 23). In Europe,
corruption facilitates the illegal wildlife trade particularly through corrupt officials in the
border states. Wild birds and caviar enter the EU through corrupt customs officers in
Southeast European states, while some border officials in Spain could be bribed for €20–
50 (van Uhm 2016a). These bribes include money and gifts, but also wildlife products.
Other forms of corruption involve government officials that abuse their position to
smuggle wildlife under a diplomatic cover. There are several examples where embassy
employees in South Africa facilitate wildlife trafficking (e.g. Lemieux and Clarke 2009).
While in many disorganized crime networks corruption exists, in the more organized
crime groups, the corruption element is well-organized in which the risk of getting
caught is calculated and corrupt practices are embedded in the organization.
Thus, the criminal networks involved in wildlife trafficking are far from being one
homogenized group. A range of offending types exist, the level of organization varies
considerably, and the groups dominate different ‘niche’markets. Even though each wildlife
market has its own criminogenic features, we have identified four overarching similarities
that make the illegal wildlife market particularly vulnerable to organized crime groups in
particular. First, several authors underline consistently that illegal wildlife trade is especially
attractive for organized crime due to the low sentences and low risk of being caught. Second,
the poaching of wildlife usually takes place in economically weak states and regions in
Table 1 - The characteristics of the three categories of crime groups and networks
Type of wildlife
smuggling network*
Level of
organization
Degree of
opportunism
Links with
other crimes
Level of
corruption
Organized crime group +/+ ± +/+ +/+
Corporate crime group +/+ ± −/− −/+
Disorganized crime network −/− +/+ ± ±
*These types are theoretically distinct, but do overlap in reality. From low to high: −/−, ± , −/+, +/+
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which the government fails to effectively use the monopoly of violence. It is well-known
that organized crime groups thrive well in such areas. Third, the symbiotic relationship
between the underworld and upperworld provides a breeding ground for organized crime
groups. Not only do legitimate infrastructures provide opportunities to launder illegal
wildlife in all stages of the wildlife trade, in particular corruption regularly plays a significant
role in facilitating wildlife crimes in source, transit or destination countries by disorganized
crime networks, and corporate or organized crime groups. Fourth, the rising global scarcity
of wildlife and high prices on the black market increasingly attracts transnational criminal
organizations. Several examples highlight that organized crime groups shift from ‘tradition-
al’ criminal activities, such as drug or human trafficking, to the illegal trade in wildlife (van
Uhm 2020). With that in mind, we predict further blurring of these lines with organized
crime groupsworkingmore closely with corporate crime groups in order to get their wildlife
‘products’ on the market. Disorganized crime networks will continue to adapt to the
emergence of new wildlife markets and geographies as well as to the efforts to dismantle
wildlife trafficking put forward by law enforcement.
Wildlife trafficking is undertaken by a sophisticated diverse range of perpetrators and is
far more structured and intertwined with the legal sphere than current rhetoric suggests. The
distinctions between actors involved in wildlife trafficking are important. Knowing if a
particular wildlife market has elements of organised and/or corporate crime groups, and/or
disorganised crime networks should underpin prevention and disruption strategies of law
enforcement. In particular, and as we have suggested – the much overlooked – element of
corporate crime groups integrated within the wildlife economies needs to be addressed.
Corporate crime is not a traditional sphere for law enforcement, and is sometimes addressed
through regulatory structures, which indicates the need for much greater collaboration with
other regulatory agencies like financial crime and fraud units as well as insurance companies
and banks. To save many species from overexploitation and extinction, a more nuanced and
complete view of the actors and their varied structures is crucial.
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